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ABSTRACT
Francisco Franco is one of the most formidable dictators of the 20th century, and his
overwhelming control over the press and other media in Spain during his 36 years as an
authoritarian dictator is among the most notable forms of press censorship in history. This thesis
examines the various measures Franco’s regime took to censor the press and other media
platforms (print news, non-news print media and digital media) and explains that, through these
measures, Franco’s regime fits and even expands the Authoritarian Theory of Mass
Communication. This theory has historic and philosophical backgrounds, but by applying the
basic principles to the modern example of the franquismo period in Spain, one can see the
overarching idea of censorship in the media imposed by an authoritarian regime. Furthermore,
this thesis will examine the aftermath of the regime, and how the legacy of censorship and media
corruption still lingers in Spanish society today.
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Part One: Introduction
We, as Americans, feel entitled toward our freedom of speech, and rightly so, as the First
Amendment guarantees this right in our lives as professionals and citizens. But what about the
injustice and suppression of speech and press in other countries? It’s a reality thousands across
the world live with today, and an issue that has countless historic roots. Many people have at
least some kind of understanding about media censorship in foreign countries today, but in
Western society, many adhere to the disillusioned mindset of “it would never happen here.” But
what many in today’s world do not know (due to a combination of societal apathy and passage of
time), is that Spain, one of the world’s most influential Western countries, was subjected to
tyrannical media censorship for decades under the reign of dictator Francisco Franco from 1939
to 1975.
While Franco’s name may not stir the terror in Spaniards’ hearts like it once did, he is
still a formidable historic figure when considering fascist dictators of the 20th century. Allied
with Benito Mussolini of Italy and Adolf Hitler of Germany (among others), Franco quickly
made the Kingdom of Spain his own toy to manipulate, exploit, and censor. His atrocities are
numerous, including orders of mass executions and assassinations, repressing regional cultures
and languages, and maintaining a tight grip on the press and cultural media for his propaganda.
Most notably, for the sake of this thesis, Franco restricted the citizens, authors, filmmakers, and
journalists of Spain from the freedom of speech and expression that is now guaranteed in their
Constitution.
The significance of this time in Spain’s history reaches beyond its time and borders.
Franco’s era and his censorship practices upon the press serve as an example of an overarching
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theory that reaches back to the philosophies of ancient Greece: the Authoritarian Theory of Mass
Communication.
By the definition coined by scholar Fred Seibert, this is “a theory under which the press,
as an institution, is controlled in its functions and operation by organized society through another
institution, government” (Siebert 10). This theory is largely considered the most pervasive of all
press theories, both historically and geographically. One can see instances of the authoritarian
method of control throughout historic dictatorships all over the world, such as in Japan, Russia,
several South American countries, and of course Spain, among many others. However, the
theory itself was developed in England in the 16th and 17th centuries, and has since spread
throughout the world as an accepted method of examining and explaining power struggles in the
press (Siebert 7).
Although the theory appears straightforward, there is actually much more complexity to it
than simply a government’s control over the media. The obvious reason for controlling the media
as an authoritarian regime is to maintain power and promote propaganda, but there are
psychological and philosophical reasons behind it that better explain why authoritarian leaders
choose this theory for their own means. The desire to control the media as a governmental
institution is driven by four philosophical relations between man and the state: the nature of man,
the nature of society and of the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of
knowledge and truth (Siebert 10). All four of these relations revolve around one goal: for man to
be the pervasive and absolute entity in charge of his own free will. These may seem like abstract
ideas, but they all come back to one philosophy: an authoritarian leader, above all, desires
absolute power over his people, and can ensure this power by using the press to “support and
advance the policies of the government in power; and to service the state” (Siebert 7). Franco
6

was no different, and was particularly known for his ambition to transform Spain into a
conservative, Catholic country by means of promoting his ideals via various forms of media,
including the press and other cultural platforms (theater, film, literature, etc.), and by suppressing
unfavorable opinions in said platforms.
The Authoritarian Theory of Mass Media can be broken down into five specific
principles: 1. Media should do nothing which could undermine establish authority. 2. Media
should always (or ultimately) be subordinate to established authority. 3. Media should avoid
offense to majority, or dominant, moral and political values. 4. Censorship can be justified to
enforce these principles. 5. Unacceptable attacks on authority, deviations from official policy or
offenses against moral codes should be criminal offenses (McQuail 86). Under these principles,
clearly the press does not have a lot of autonomy to publish what they want in fear of potential
criminal charges and/or censorship. In short, the authoritarian government in control has absolute
power over the press, both on WHO is allowed to print or produce media and WHAT they are
allowed to produce. The theory claims that authoritarian leaders view this control as a means to
“protect and prevent the people from the national threats through any form of communication
(information or news)” (Communicationtheory.org). This can either be done via licensing
requirements, legislation, or censorship policies; in Franco’s case, it was all three. If these
measures are violated, the government has the right to revoke any licenses, increase censorship
policies, or restrict “any sensitive issues from press to maintain peace and security in the nation”
(communicationtheory.org). This, of course, is from the viewpoint of the dictator or government,
who disregard the injustices they inflict upon the press and their citizens.
Such a viewpoint suggests that the government in charge does not consider its
constituents capable of “developing the attributes of a civilized man” (Siebert 11). This mindset
7

actually originates from the Greek philosopher Plato, who postulated that the state is required to
establish a unified system of ideals and cultural goals to then impose upon the people, which was
enforced by controlling the opinions and discussions of the citizenry (Siebert 12). Under the
Authoritarian Theory, therefore, there is no room for private thought or opinions, nor is there a
welcoming environment for political discussion or criticism. In short, Plato theorized that this
authoritarian structure was best to control and maintain a stable country, and therefore the state
must cultivate a society that is obedient to authority. One of the means to create such a controlled
environment is to control what society hears or reads, which thus leads to control and
suppression of the press.
It is important to note, however, that the Authoritarian Theory is not the same as a similar
theory, the Soviet Communist Theory (also known as the Totalitarian Theory). While communist
or totalitarian governments, as the title suggests, has total control over the press due to their sole
ownership of all platforms, authoritarian regimes contrarily allow private ownership of the media
(Seibert 7). Under Franco’s authoritarian rule, the press was not completely government owned,
yet was still subjected to government policies and censorship. It is a minute distinction between
these two theories, but an important one to consider when, in later sections, I will examine
exactly how Franco’s government influenced all press, both privately and state owned.
While this press theory does allow for private ownership, one of the main problems,
historically, with the authoritarian system is establishing restrain and control over the private
media. Siebert notes in his essay that there have been attempts at various methods, but no one
has been effective over an extended period of time (19). In Franco’s regime, he employed a
method of censorship boards, which would examine and edit every piece of media before it was
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published. While, of course, this ultimately failed, it did last for all 36 years of the regime (with
some modifications over the years).
Although the typical Authoritarian Theory usually applies to news media, this thesis will
expand and apply the theory to other mediums under Franco’s regime, as he also censored and
restricted content from such platforms as literature, theater, film, and more. Thus, the era of
franquismo (the Spanish term for Franco’s years in power) does not only embody the
Authoritarian Theory in its news media, but expands the definition of the theory itself to include
other forms of media, despite their exclusion in the typical definition.
The days of Franco’s regime and the Authoritarian Theory has long passed in Spain and
the Authoritarian Theory no longer applies to the structure of Spanish media. The freedom of the
media in Spain has improved tenfold since the Franco era, as has the freedom to express the
traditions of the country (languages, cultures, etc.). Part of this improvement is due to the
resistance of the Spanish people to unjust fascism and censorship. The Spanish people could just
as well conceded and accepted the censorship, but to many of the writers, reporters, artists, and
filmmakers at the time—as well as many civilians—this was not an option. The widespread
resistance of many to the various censoring methods in Spain is, without a doubt, part of the
reason the Authoritarian Theory ultimately failed. It was not simply the death of the dictator that
overturned his grasp on the media, but the resistance held to it by its victims that helped it
crumble. This is not to say the resistance efforts were easy. As I shall examine in the following
sections, the censorship of the media was widespread, encompassing not only the print and
broadcast press at the time, but even artistic and cultural productions and publications, such as
literature (both foreign and domestic), theater, film, and more. When examining the drastic
changes in the Spanish society and legislation today, it is difficult to imagine that not even a
9

century ago, the Spanish media was not allowed to report on current events freely, let alone have
any editorial opinion or criticism of the government. Today, the right to freedom of expression is
explicitly guaranteed in its post-franquismo Constitution, a welcome change for Spain.
Is all of this change, all of the progress of Spain’s legislation intended to suggest that
Spain was suddenly a completely free country in regard to media and press? Of course not.
While, visually, Spain became more flamboyant with their images after the franquismo period
(i.e. allowing nudity in publications, liberalized cinematic standards in terms of content and
ratings, etc.), they were not at complete liberty to report what they wanted about the government.
Although the dictatorship was officially over in 1975, corruption and the legacy of Franco’s
control over the media lingered on for years after his death, and the remnants of that legacy is
still relevant today.
To summarize, this thesis aims to dissect the man himself, Francisco Franco, and how
through his 36 years as dictator his control of the print (both news and otherwise), digital, and
cultural media demonstrates the overarching philosophy of the Authoritarian Theory of Mass
Communication, as well as expanding upon the given definition. Although this absolute control
dissolved with his regime and eventually concluded with Franco’s death, the beginning of a new,
liberated Spain was not easy to achieve due to lingering effects of the censoring legislation and
societal norms. By examining the past and present of media censorship in Spain, this thesis will
demonstrate that this example of dictatorial media control emulates all the typical characteristics
of an authoritarian regime, thus making Franco’s hold on the media (news and otherwise) a
certified example of an expanded version of the Authoritarian Theory of Mass Communication.
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Part Two: The Man and His Regime
To understand the hunger for power and the cruel dictatorship with which Franco
reigned, one must understand, at least briefly, who Francisco Franco was.
Franco was born in 1892 as Francisco Franco Bahamonde in El Ferrol, a small town in
the province of Galicia. Born to a “modest, middle-class naval family” (Ager), Franco himself
enrolled in a military academy in Toledo at the age of 15, and gained military repertoire and
prestige from his subsequent military successes in Morocco, where Spain was recollecting
territories they had lost in years previously (Pack). Franco quickly stood out as a prominent
military figure, and was the youngest commanding officer since Napoleon Bonaparte (Lea).
However, he was not, at first, predisposed to a military career. In fact, in comparison to Benito
Mussolini or Fidel Castro (dictators to whom he is often compared), he was not as predictable in
his future career. Quite the contrary: Franco is often described as lacking in a strong political
ideology, and, simply put, he morphed his regime as he went, doing anything to conserve power
(Pack).
In short, Francisco Franco “winged it.”
It is also important to understand Franco’s background when considering his future
practice of censoring regional languages. Franco was born in Galicia, where three million of its
inhabitants learn both Castellano (Spanish) and Galego (Galician), the regional language.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that although Franco did not learn Galician as a child, he
was certainly exposed to it and at least understood the basics. This then begs the question: why
did he ban his native regional language from being printed and spoken in his own country?
Perhaps he may have argued for unification and nationalistic reasons, but the true answer lies in
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the idea of censorship as power. Franco, a dictator trying to control an entire country by means
of propaganda, understood that his message could not reach as far if some citizens were not
speaking strictly castellano (Ager). This desire for power and unity is typical of any fascist
dictator’s regime; under the guise of desiring a unified country, dictators often suppress cultural
diversity to create a unified, unwaveringly loyal state upon which they can impose their absolute
power. Franco attempted (yet ultimately failed) to do this by prohibiting the regional languages
of Spain.
Despite his meager beginnings, Franco quickly gained influence and prestige through the
military. The catalyst for Franco’s quest for power and control in the country came with the
collapse of King Alfonso XIII’s reign, which caused the closure of the Military Academy in
Zaragoza in 1931, where Franco had served as director three years earlier. Though Franco was
open about his distaste toward a constitutional monarchy and communism, he declined to partake
in a military coup attempt in 1932, which eventually failed. Nevertheless, he drew inspiration
from his Catholic faith and Spanish patriotism in order to lead a successful insurgence in the
Spanish region of Asturias in 1934. This, finally, gave Franco the power and recognition as a
strong military figure that he needed to propel him to the title of generalissimo (the equivalent of
commander-in-chief) and dictator two years after (Pack).
Franco, like other fascist dictators, feared communism in his country above all else. He
was convinced that communist insurgents were bringing down Spain’s infrastructure from the
inside, and sought to suppress all sources of this ideology (Pack). In reality, communism was far
from a threat in Spain. Disillusioned by this imaginary communist insurgence, he also rejected
the quickly growing government system in the Western World: democracy; “Franco saw himself
as the one designated to save Spain from the chaos and instability visited upon the country by the
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evils of parliamentary democracy and political parties, which he blamed for destroying the unity
of Spain” (Solsten and Meditz).
Upheld by the support of military rebels and the Catholic Church and determined to
prevent the growing potential for a parliamentary democracy in Spain, Franco began a military
rebellion in Spanish-held Morocco in July 1936, which eventually morphed into the Spanish
Civil War (Pack). The war was between two forces: the Republicans, which were against
Franco’s troops and favored a parliamentary system of government, and the Nationalists, which
were on Franco’s side and supported the military rebellion and authoritarian system (Brown).
From the transition from the end of the war to the beginning of the regime, there was
motive for censorship policies. The Spanish Civil War took thousands of lives, both in battle and
by government-sponsored mass executions of opponents to the military rebellion. In the case of
the mass executions, the motive for censorship was clear; the government clearly wanted to keep
the government-ordered executions to remain covered-up, and there was no better way to ensure
this than censoring the media against reporting the gruesome facts.
Also while rising to power, Franco aligned himself with a few powerful groups within
Spain, all of which he knew would, in turn, support his extreme conservative views. Most
notably among these groups were the Catholic Church (which would have huge influence over
censorship methods and processes later in the regime) and the Falange, a right-wing group of
authoritarian Nationalist supporters. The Falange fused with Franco’s growing group of
supporters in April of 1937, two years before Franco would officially assume power as
generalissimo (dictator) of Spain (Fusi and Carr 191). However, these groups were never as
powerful as Franco alone was, and he preferred and kept it that way, controlling them under
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“their common loyalty to Franco. Franco was particularly skillful in manipulating each of these
‘families,’ giving each a taste of power, but not allowing any group or individual to create an
independent base from which to challenge his authority” (Solsten and Meditz).
Franco’s following among these groups and by part of the population was cult-like, with
his supporters wildly following every move he made. By 1964, he was being called such things
as “Minister of God,” “the man sent from God and made Leader,” etc. This only expanded his
material for propaganda, and in November of 1964, personally starred in a film made especially
for him: Franco, ese hombre (This Man Franco). Indeed, this exaltation went so far into
Franco’s head that he began to believe, according to Marshal Pétain, that he was “the Virgin
Mary’s cousin” (Fusi and Carr 112-113).
Along with various Spanish groups, he also ideologically aligned himself with Adolf
Hitler’s New Order, moving Spain from a monarchy to an authoritarian dictatorship with Franco
at the helm, a similar structure to Hitler’s Germany. This dictatorship lasted through World War
II, but Franco surprisingly refused to become involved with the ongoing conflict between the
Axis and Allied powers, and was the only noncommunist dictator to last through the war (Pack).
Instead of becoming involved in the war, Franco focused on strengthening his hold upon Spain,
and in 1962, modified the dictatorship yet again. Although nothing changed in the structure of
the government, Franco declared the regime a monarchy by technicality, yet continued to
maintain his stature as ruler for life (Fusi and Carr 118).
Franco’s regime, although technically a monarchy, was still considered an authoritarian
regime. However, many experts classify his specific authoritarian structure as “semifascist,”
mainly due to his link to the Catholic Church and his (albeit limited) openness to international
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connections. This slight difference makes his regime notably different than other dictatorships in
Europe at the time, as he did not pursue the totalitarian domination of all societal institutions
(social, cultural, religions, economic, etc.), but opted for an authoritarian system and ideology
(Solsten and Meditz). This definition of his regime carries over into his implementation of press
theories. To reiterate, Franco’s method of press control was authoritarian, not totalitarian,
meaning he allowed for some privately owned and foreign publications in Spain yet still held
immense control over all areas of the media. Again, this is a slight but important distinction of
the structure of the regime.
Describing all of Franco’s 83 years of life and 36 years in power could take up an entire
thesis in itself. For the sake of studying his control over the media, however, only the basics are
necessary. After 36 years of authoritarian control in the military and politics, suppression of
regional languages (despite his background with Galego from his youth in Galicia), and
imposing Catholic and dictatorial ideology in the press, Franco’s time as dictator ended with his
death in 1975.
In the following sections, each level of media that existed in Spain during Franco’s 36
years of power will be dissected: print (newspapers, magazines, etc.), non-news print (literature
and theater), and digital media (television, radio, and cinema). Although each level was affected
by censorship policies, the methods and reasons for censorship varied among them, all
encompassed under two key pieces of legislation: the Press Law of 1938 and the Ley Fraga of
1966.
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Part Three: Print Media
Even from early in his rise to power, before any legislation was formally passed and
before Franco assumed the role as generalissimo and dictator, we can see the Authoritarian
Theory in use via censorship as a political tool.
It was August 1936, just a month after Franco launched his military rebellion against the
Spanish government in Morocco and began to seize power as dictator of Spain. The rebel forces
drop bombs into Madrid, leveling buildings and leaving the citizens of Madrid shaken. Miles
away, a plaza in Toledo also suffers bomb damage. And, in the United States, The New York
Times reports the bombings as “passed by the censor” (The New York Times 1936).
This is just one of many articles passed by censors in the years Franco ruled Spain, as
well as the years leading up to the regime during the Civil War. The article also included a
message from the government: a safety order issued to the citizens of Madrid regarding the
bombings. Whether this was one of the government’s mandated, pre-written messages for the
media to publish or just a friendly reminder, we are not sure. However, seeing as this notice was
“passed by the censor” and directly affected Spanish citizens, it seems possible that this safety
notice was, indeed, part of the government control and influence on the media, reaching as far as
The New York Times.
This early censorship is a result of the Prensa del Movimiento (the Press of the
Movement), a committee molded out of publishing facilities that was confiscated by Franco’s
supporters from the Republic during the Civil War. The Prensa was originally only meant to be a
provisional measure for the duration of the Civil War, yet remained in effect long into his
regime, and was renamed the Press Law of 1938 (Ley de Prensa in Spanish) when Franco
16

officially came into power. This legislation, in simple terms, “required state authorization for
publications of any kind, and provided for the suspension of any publication without appeal. In
addition, it enabled the state to intervene in the appointment and dismissal of newspaper
managers and editors, even in the case of the privately owned press” (Gunther). Again there is
that distinction of totalitarian control allowing privately owned media sources, yet still exercising
complete control over them.
From this basic summary of the legislation alone, we can see the Authoritarian Theory at
work. The entire legislation is long and arduous to read, but it does outline the basic
responsibilities (read as: authoritarian powers) of the government upon the press. They are as
follows, translated from Spanish to English (translations modified for readability):
“First: regulation of the number and extend of the news publications. Second: the
intervention in the designation of management. Third: regulation of the journalist profession.
Fourth: the supervision of the activity of the press. Fifth: censorship while its suppression is
established” (derechos.org).
All of these duties were handed to the Servicio Nacional de Prensa, which was the
vehicle in which the government (overall) could efficiently control the press. In short, it was this
Servicio that turned the regime from a dictatorship into an example of the Authoritarian Theory
of Mass Communication. Under each of the responsibilities listed above (and when taking the
entire legislation into consideration), the government quickly took control of all press faculties in
Spain including the press, thus making the Franco regime immediately an example of the
Authoritarian Theory.
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The Junta de Censura, or Censorship Board, specifically held the most control of the
media as part of the Servicio Nacional de Prensa. Through the Junta, the single political party of
the regime controlled all press in Spain, as well as produced and distributed propaganda
(Villarrova). The Junta was composed of representatives of the Catholic Church, government
officials, and other Franco loyalists, and exercised absolute control over all public and private
publications (Lea). In this focus upon upholding and encouraging Catholic virtues through his
control over the media, we can see Franco’s obsession with having a moral and faithful country,
even if said country could only be obtained by manipulation and power.
Although this law affected news publications and non-news publications (such as
literature, both foreign and Spanish), journalists were under especially strict control. During and
following the Spanish Civil War, many journalists were removed or “purged” from their jobs,
and were required to officially register with the government to maintain their positions. And this
was just the beginning: not only was government registration required, but journalists had to
submit their work for daily inspections, and all edited work required signed authorization from
the Junta before it could be published. Much of the censorship enforced by the Junta was to
eliminate “any information or ideas considered by the Church or government to be dangerous or
subversive were immediately redacted or rejected altogether in order to prevent ‘corruption’ or
‘contamination’ of the populace” (Lea). These same guidelines continued for decades, heavily
based in Catholic ideology and morality.
When examining its code of morals and values, it is no wonder that the Catholic Church
in Spain eventually began to support Franco’s censorship and propaganda actions. Spain has a
large tradition of censorship from the era of the Reyes Católicos (Catholic Kings), which still
lingers in the traditionally Catholic country today, perpetuated by the single entity formed
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between the Church and State (Jimenez). The Church had profound influences in the censorship
boards during Franco’s era, and was quick to align itself with his regime to gain control over the
country.
The Spanish regime’s propaganda was different than other fascist propaganda in Europe,
because it focused heavily on Catholic morality and ideology. That being said, Church leaders
were very active in the process of propaganda and censorship, and a Pamplona priest, Fermin
Yzurdiaga, was “one of the party’s most active propagandists,” eventually becoming a chief of
press and propaganda of the pro-Franco Falangist party in 1937. This Falangist propaganda and
control was directed, for the most part, toward the working class more than any other social
group, as the working class constituted the vast majority of the Spanish population (Payne 254).
By collaborating with other powerful groups in the political regime, the Catholic Church was
able to further its own ideologies, while, in turn, supporting fellow conservative movements.
Franco, in exchange, was allowed immense power within the Church, including an agreement
between the Spanish government and the Vatican in 1953, which allowed Franco to control the
selection of new bishops within Spain (Gutierrez). Thus, the dynamic between the Catholic
Church and the regime was not one-way, but rather was more of a symbolic power exchange and
mutual desire to exercise control on the country.
The Junta, however, was not only an entity that edited publications, but also produced
mandated content for the media, as we suspect was the case in the earlier New York Times article.
The regime demanded publications or broadcast to follow its “orders”: prescribed methods
acceptable by the government to report and interpret news (particularly political news), or orders
to avoid coverage of entire events. Some orders were so detailed that they even specified how
publications should align photos, size headlines, or use arguments in editorials. Not even
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advertising in the publications was exempt from the control and mandates of the Junta
(Gunther).
The problem with the mandated orders method of censorship is that today we do not
know what the published articles would have been without these restrictions and requirements. In
other words, in the case of censorship, there is an extreme lack of evidence; rather, the lack of
evidence is evidence of censorship. While some aspects of publications are things we must
simply accept as they are, we can examine certain articles or visual elements within publications
as artifacts of Spain’s censoring policies and compare them to the factual reality of what
occurred. For example, historians know the events of the Civil War and the many deaths that
occurred, yet the complete lack of reporting done on these deaths in the Spanish press acts as
evidence of censorship. These observations, however, only emerge decades after the fact, as the
censorship during the regime was so complete that some citizens went generally unaware of what
was occurring within their own country. Nevertheless, with modern technologies at our disposal,
we can compare past publications with the facts we now know about the franquismo period, and
use these comparisons to demonstrate the censorship.
However, this still poses a problem when trying to specifically describe censorship. As
most of the comparisons are generalizations, it is hard to specifically point out articles that show
the lack of reporting about the known events at the time. As stated previously, most censorship
control under Franco’s Authoritarian Theory principles was to eliminate content that was against
the regime’s policies, was not congruent with Catholic ideology, and/or directly insulted Franco
or his followers. The government orders contributed to this trend, but also were part of a crucial
element for the regime, especially post-war: a political cover-up of acts of violence to limit
public awareness of the horrific events that had occurred in the Civil War, and the continual
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violence that was occurring post-war. This is where we must use generalizations and lack of
evidence to prove this cover-up. In short, as is typical under an authoritarian control of the press,
there is no evidence that any publications distributed articles that adequately described the reality
of Spain during this time. Instead, papers and magazines were filled with government-approved
articles.
We can see this lack of evidence by using an online archive of all major papers in Spain
during Franco’s time. In 2007 the “Hemeroteca Digital” was formed, a project by the Digital
Spanish Library (Biblioteca Digital Hispanica), which aimed to electronically scan and publish
Spanish newspapers and magazines from decades and centuries past. A collection that started
with 143 publications has grown to over 1 thousand, with nearly 5 million pages of texts
available to peruse, as of 2012. Although this project was initially started for conservation
reasons, it is also a useful tool for those looking for examples of Franco’s censorship. This gives
not only researchers access to old publications, including those from Franco’s years, but allows
the Spanish public to examine news and see the vast absence of accurate reporting. For
convenience sake, there are filtering methods for the collection, including filters by date, topic,
keywords, and more (bne.es).
When I conducted a search of all publications within the archive with keywords “Franco”
and “Guerra Civil” (Civil War) between the years 1936 and 1975, there was no evidence of any
articles that reported anything more than the bare facts of the war and the dictatorship that
followed. There was no mention of the thousands of Spaniards who went missing during the war,
nothing about the government-ordered executions, and only praise for Franco in any of the
articles (hemerotecadigital.bne.es). In short, the government began, sustained, and ended its
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years applying the principles of the Authoritarian Theory upon the press, especially as it tried to
keep its war crimes away from public attention.
The period of 1936-1945 was a time of “brutal repression” and a rise of the wealthy elite,
a power gained through violence during and after the war. Approximately 200,000 people were
executed by the regime following the Civil War, and an estimated 200,000 more died of hunger
or illness. Even more opted for suicide to escape the repression, torture, and overall violence of
the time. In Galicia, Franco’s own province, an order was issued that no death certificate was to
be given to families that identified the bodies of their executed relatives. Spaniards had to endure
torture, societal humiliation (ex, shaving the heads of women, etc.). But none of these atrocities
were reported in Franco’s press, as the government-issued orders ensured that the media would
publish the “proper” news, and not the unsavory actions of the regime to its citizens (Richards
30).
Under these orders and censorship, political news was limited to official approved press
releases about ceremonies, appointments and inaugurations, in the tone of the authoritarian
regime. Local news was allowed a marginal amount of leniency, but when critical, often caused
conflicts with local authorities and sanctions on the offending paper. Surprisingly, international
news was the most balanced, and was the largest section of the paper. This was especially true
for papers that could afford to employ foreign correspondents (Gunther). Publications also used
foreign news to create the expected favorable image of the regime (Watkins 59). By carefully
selecting snippets of foreign news, which was generally more acceptable than domestic news,
publications were promoting an exalted, propaganda-like image of Franco. One highly popular
paper, Arriba, chose to use foreign news to illustrate Franco’s positive and improving reputation
abroad: U.S. reporters said “the Caudillo’s prestige increases” due to his foreign influence,
22

Belgium papers “praised Franco”, and more (Watkins). From this, we can see that early in the
regime publications were not outspoken against their repression and the atrocities of the regime,
and generally chose to go along with the expectations of the Junta and the Press Law, and agreed
to publish content mandated by the government.
Whether consciously or unconsciously, Franco’s government applied the principles of the
Authoritarian Theory from the beginning of his reign. As demonstrated by their use of praising
international content, the media was, indeed, “doing nothing which could undermine established
authority,” meaning it adhering to the prohibition of printing critical articles (whether factual or
opinionated). Secondly, in conjunction with the fourth principle, censorship policies (such as the
Press Law of 1938) were used to enforce the subordinate actions of the press (McQuail 86).
Enjoying his strict hold upon the country and focused on his nationalistic goals, Franco
chose to not participate in World War II, yet Spain still felt the effects of this brutal war. Franco
was notoriously friendly with Hitler and Mussolini, despite refusing to join them and the other
Axis powers during the war. Nevertheless, Spain continued its habit of repression of its press, a
policy that is, according to author Stanley Payne, “very broad, much more extensive than the
juridical prosecution of individuals, for it involved rigorous censorship and a purge of education
and other state personnel. The entire decade of the 1940s was a time of strict repression in Spain”
(Payne 18). This implementation of the Authoritarian Theory and its practices (although not
specified by name) was noticeable by many journalists, although they could not do anything to
stop it. One journalist, Ramon Garriga, noted that, “‘in no other country did the press behave in
such a servile manner during the war years’” (Payne 122). Thus, although Franco did not join
forces with his fellow fascist leaders, Hitler and Mussolini, he continued to implement the
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restrictive policies in his own country, making little progress toward liberalization and
opportunity for Spanish citizens.
Another journalist plagued by censorship on a daily basis was famed author Gabriel
García Márquez. Though Columbian, García Márquez worked for a time as a reporter in Spain, a
period which unfortunately fell under the years of the regime. In the newsroom at El Universal in
Cartagena, García Márquez recalls the daily visits from a government censor: “’se instalaba en
un escritorio de la redaction como en casa propia desde las seis de la tarde, con voluntad y
mando para no autorizar ni una letra que pudiera rozar el orden publico’ [‘beginning at six
o’clock in the evening, he installed himself at a desk in the newsroom as if he were in his own
house, with the intention and power not to authorize a single letter that might interfere with
public order’]” (Herrero-Olaizola 125). This demonstrates the subordination outlined in the
Theory with which writers and journalists succumbed to after decades of censorship. At this
point, there was no reason to rebel or openly disagree with the policies, for it could mean losing
one’s job, publishing license, etc. (Herrero-Olaizola 125). Not only did the Junta censor the
press, but actively banned and exiled certain writers that were considered “antifranquistas o
simplemente indiferentes al ‘Movimiento Nacional’ [anti-Franco or simply indifferent to the
National Movement]” (Jimenez). While García Márquez himself was not exiled, there were
instances of journalists being forcibly removed from their jobs, as well as exiled to other
countries.
Upon examining all of these requirements set forth by the government and the principles
of the Authoritarian Theory, one begins to wonder how the regime could have possibly enforced
such strict standards. Part of the government’s strategy to maintain control was to keep the
policies arbitrary; that is, the criteria used by the Junta to determine what had to be censored
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“had an aura of mystery” (Watkins 63). This hazy, unspecific policy allowed the government and
the Junta much flexibility and power when it came to determining what was allowed to be
published. The kept the categories of the prohibited content broad: sexual immorality (as
determined by Catholic standards), political opinions misaligned with the regime, improper use
of language (also known as “linguistic purity”), and religious topics that were not strictly
Catholic (Watkins 63). Under these broad terms, the Junta could practically do whatever it
wanted, as long as it justified its actions under one of these reasons. Furthermore, the fear of
“criminal offenses” was a crucial principle to keep the Authoritarian Theory functioning, as
keeping journalists in a constant state of fear of persecution also kept them subservient to the
policies of the government.
Most apparent, however, was that expression of political opposition to the Franco regime
was prohibited, which is of course the main principle from the Theory, as outlined by McQuail.
Any open disagreement or dissent would be censored by the government, and thus it was futile to
attempt to publish it in commercially available newspapers, so newspapers began to start
sounding the same. Press under the Franco dictatorship, as with many dictatorships, was not
taken at face value. Readers were conditioned to read as much for what was not said as what
actually was published (Watkins). Tellingly, in a 1964 survey, 65 percent of readers in Madrid
said they did not believe the news they read (Gunther).
It’s hard to determine exactly how damaging the years of censorship was to the press and
culture of Spain, since there is no evidence to suggest how the press or other publications or
cultural endeavors may have been without limitations. This is part of the authoritarian strategy of
media control; that is, taking over all publications (public and private) by force or coercion and
transforming them all into pro-state publications. By snatching up the majority of the publishing
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sites, the new Francoist state became the primary newspaper source in Spain over privatelyowned sources, and one of the most important in all of Europe when considering numbers: by
1948, there were 38 daily publications (“dailies”) in publication, as well as eight weekly and five
monthly magazines. These are just the numbers, however; in terms of circulation, the privately
owned press benefited from wider circulation, but were still subjected to censorship as dictated
by the Press Law and the Authoritarian Theory (Gunther).
However, public publications under regime control occasionally had a critical article slip
through. For example, in 1941, Franco appointed General Valenti Galarza as Minister of the
Interior, which caused so much opposition among the country that a sarcastic article was
published in the daily newspaper Arriba on May 18, just 13 days after Franco’s appointment of
Galarza on May 5. The article was from the Falangist group’s point of view, but the author
criticized the new Minister so much that it caused Franco to re-work his cabinet appointments
(Fusi and Carr 56). While this was a very risky move (the reporter could have faced criminal
charges), it was clearly a significant step for the media’s influence over the government.
Nevertheless, the private press dominated the readership of Spaniards, and the state
suffered as its circulation decline, plunging to a collapse in the final years of franquismo. These
private sources, however, were not by any means primarily anti-Francoist. In fact, the Catholic
Church (arguably the primary supporter of Franco that enjoyed immense political influence)
boasted 34 newspapers in publication to a circulation of nearly 340,000 at the end of the 1950s.
Other private publications included Ya (reaching over 100,000 people) and ABC (reaching over
200,000) (Gunther). But, again, these private publications could not exercise a freedom of press,
having to always adhere to the overall ideology of the regime.
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Although franquismo Spain had a large number of newspapers in active publication, the
circulation rate was low overall, averaging only 71 newspapers sold per thousand persons in
Spain. Compared to other large first-world countries such as the United States, France and Japan,
who averaged between 242 and 573 papers sold per thousand, this is strikingly low. This decline
in consumers is a direct result of the censorship policies, as they did not only keep the public
uninformed when they read the news, but lack of accurate information eventually discouraged
them from even buying it, as nearly everything had the same, government-approved messages.
While newspapers had little success in informing the public on the goings-on in the
regime, let alone serving as a platform for criticism, magazines quickly became the medium in
which political criticism could be most easily channeled. This was in part due to their more
limited and less frequent circulation, which was an advantage: the Junta was more focused on
the daily newspapers, and thus often overlooked magazines in their rigorous censorship policies.
Magazines were in a better position to articulate controversial opinions and values and provide
the public a platform where they could get more accurate information. However, this increase in
popularity ended after freedom of the press was established post-Franco (Gunther).
The lack of information in the media, both in papers and magazines, caused not only an
acute mistrust of the media, but also a mass disinterest in politics within Spain. To successfully
run and maintain an authoritarian regime, a government must placate their citizens and maintain
a constant state of passiveness, rather than rally citizens to become active participants in society.
This technique is mimicked in the Authoritarian Theory, which advocates for the media to be
“subordinate to established authority” (McQuail 86). Controlling the media in one’s country is a
key tool to creating this passiveness, which is exactly what Franco’s regime achieved. By
diluting the information available to citizens and screening information for items that might
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cause criticism or outrage, Franco’s government was able to keep the citizens uninformed
enough to “bore most Spaniards into passivity and acquiescence, and deprived them of stimuli
that might have triggered political mobilization.” As a result, 50-55 percent of Spaniards
reported to have “simplistic political attitudes,” as reported by studies in the late 1960s. Only 15
percent of the population actively identified and supported the regime, but only about 25 percent
were actively against the regime. This leaves the majority of the citizenship at an apathetic or
disinterested state regarding politics. Through media censorship and control, the government
worked to pacify the population, and succeeded in doing so for the majority of society (Gunther).
However, the government’s role in the media was not only as a supervisor, but also
actively creating propaganda pieces. Franco himself even contributed to the print media, and
published a piece in Arriba under the pseudonym Jakim Boor on December 14, 1946, the first in
a line of 49 articles from 1946 to May 1951. In the articles, which later would be compiled into a
book, Masonería (Freemansonry), Franco labeled anyone and everyone who had ever criticized
him a “freemason” (including Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman, etc.), and claimed that they
conspired to work against him and a higher organized political party sought to bring down the
Spanish government with communism.
Did Franco really believe in this huge conspiracy against him and his country? Perhaps.
But it is equally, if not more likely that he used this theory and his 49 articles as a propaganda
tool, an ulterior excuse for the ultimate failure of his regime and likely an attempt to confuse the
public or induce paranoia. Physically and virtually surrounded by rejection from other countries
in the western world, Franco quickly realized that his actions were being judged, and rebuked the
judgments by creating this conspiracy. If scholars of the future are to believe this theory of a
made-up conspiracy, then it is clear that this was not just institutional propaganda, but rather a
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political tool coming directly from Franco’s own pen, a method of control and power over his
country, a means of damage control (Fusi and Carr 70-71). Furthermore, it adds to the list of
prohibited topics the press could print. To any rational person, this theory of government
conspiracy by the freemasons is wildly inaccurate and lacks concrete evidence, and yet the press
could not use their publications to criticize these ravings. Arriba could not opt to disregard these
articles and not publish them, trapped under regime control and forced to print its propaganda.
Yet again, the press theory in place within the authoritarian government prevented the press from
being critical or even offering another theory to the public. Instead, the press simply had to
accept and continue printing any ideology Franco promoted.
These ludicrous claimed also indicate a decline of power within the regime. As the years
progressed, things were quickly slipping through the cracks. For example, in 1963, the Abbot of
Montserrat made unmistakably anti-Francoist statements to Le Monde, and was expelled two
years later. Instances of published criticism became more and more common as Franco began to
lose his grip on censoring the country (Fusi and Carr 114-115).
As the years went on and as Franco lost this firm hold on the country, the regime’s policy
on press freedom began to shift. Economic liberalization and a new openness to international
influences brought promise to the country’s press, and, finally, in 1966, the censorship model
officially moved toward liberalization. The biggest step toward this liberalization was by
Manual Fraga Iribarne, who was responsible for the regulation of the media starting in 1962
(Gunther). Fraga Iribarne embodies a new societal movement in Spain in the 60s: the tendency
for citizens to become more involved in politics. Originally a law professor, Fraga Iribarne rose
to the Minister of Information and Tourism in 1962, and eventually would change the structure
and implementation of censorship upon the press (Herrero-Olaizola 39).
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At first, Fraga left the Press Law of 1938 alone, simply relaxing the repressive acts of the
censors and slightly decreasing the stream of issued “orders” to the press. However, this
relaxation movement eventually led to the Press Law of 1966, often referred to as the Ley Fraga.
This law eliminated prior censorship and alleviated direct control of the government on
newspapers and publishers. Publishers were also newly allowed to appoint their own managers
and editors, although they were still expected to adhere to the Authoritarian Theory’s principles
(i.e. not publish anything that criticized the regime, was in poor moral standard, etc.). However,
this new law ushered in an era of self-censorship, delegating the responsibility of censorship to
the publications themselves instead of the Juntas, which both helped and hurt the writers and
publishers of the time (Gunther).
This new era of liberalization has become known as the “apertura,” or the “opening up”
of the regime to freedom of the press (Gutierrez). Upon drafting his new Press Law (aptly named
after himself), Fraga delivered a speech to the Ministry of Information, of which he was in
charge: “’Ya tienen Ley de Prensa. Yo la he elaborado y yo voy a gobernar su cumplimiento. A
mi, y no a ustedes, toca administrarla.’ [‘Here you have your printing law. I drafted it, and I plan
to enforce it. I, not you, will administer it’].” Clearly Fraga was not shy about taking on the
responsibilities of his position, nor was he hesitant to express his new power and authority over
the press. At a time where censorship was strictly enforced and increasingly detrimental to
publishers, Fraga’s new proposition for a more relaxed law was not only necessary, but
welcomed (Herrero-Olaizola 1-2). It gave the media a glimpse of what was to come after
Franco’s death, and stopped the Spanish government and its censorship boards from hovering
over the newspaper’s heads, ready to clip, cut and slash anything that displeased them (Solsten
and Meditz). However, it is important to note that this new policy did nothing to reverse the
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Authoritarian Theory in place. Although it did allow for some leniency, the government still had
complete control over the media and still exercised censorship over it, still enforcing the
principles of the Theory to ensure there was no political criticism reaching the public.
The Ley Fraga also increased the specificity of the censorship policies, as it was not until
this new law that there were clear, outlined limitations given to the press (Jimenez). Under the
previous Press Law of 1938, the guidelines for censorship were more vague, and the censorship
boards had more power over the press because the broad categories of prohibited content allowed
them to decide arbitrarily which publication could stay or go. Although Franco himself did not
entirely approve of the Ley Fraga (he considered the media “pretty brazen,” and preferred the
strict censorship of before to this apertura), he actually contributed to its creation, insisting that
it outline the new, specific offenses the press could commit. These offenses included criticisms
of the Catholic Church, criticism of his regime, promoting communism or “immoral” acts, and
encouraging social disorder (strikes, protests, etc.) (Fusi and Carr 118). These specifications
furthered the Authoritarian Theory already in place, as it narrowed the scope of principle 3:
“media should avoid offence to majority, or dominant, moral and political values (McQuail 86).
Although similar to the Press Law of 1938’s specifications, and continuing the principles of the
Authoritarian Theory, the Ley Fraga elaborated what each prohibited topic included, which aided
publishers not only in avoiding offending content, but also in protecting their publications from
abuse of power from the government. With new specificity, the government could no longer
abuse their censoring powers, as the standards were more transparent to the ones they were
censoring.
Fraga added to this new specificity, and implemented a policy that dictated “three gross
misconducts in one year signified perpetual disqualification as an editor” (Barrera and
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Apezarena). By “gross misconducts,” the law meant three violations of the press printing
something that was not appropriate under their political and moral ideology, which again follows
the Authoritarian Theory’s principle of considering unacceptable content a criminal offense.
Although this “three strike” policy may sound harsh today, it actually benefitted editors; for the
first time, editors had a concrete understanding of the expectations from the government, and the
government, in turn, had concrete limitations of what punishments they could or could not inflict
upon editors.
Perhaps the biggest impact the Ley Fraga had on the media in Spain was on political
news, since there was a marginal liberalization on how publication could share their political
ideology and (light) criticism. This, however, was just for independent, private publications;
state-run publications continued to be under strict government control. As a result, independent
publications increased their circulation, while state-run ones experienced a decline in readership.
And yet, the government still had to approve what publications printed, showing that the
authoritarian government was only slightly willing to allow some leniency and still had the final
say of what content would reach the public.
Although these public sources were still prohibited from directly printing stories about
their own country’s politics, they circumvented this restriction by using other countries
transitioning to democracy as a way to educate the Spanish public—in a strange, coded way—to
what was happening in Spain. “While clashes between political ideologies, or the basic nature of
parliamentary democracy could not be openly discussed with specific reference to Spain, press
coverage of elections or parliamentary struggles in Italy, France or Britain was relatively free
from censorship, and thus could be used to teach Spaniards about the underpinnings of
democratic politics” (Gunther). Technically, reporting on other countries’ movements toward
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democracy was not undermining the state in Spain, and therefore was permitted. As long as the
press was still subordinate to its own government as dictated by the Authoritarian Theory,
international news and politics was fair game.
With the increased leniency and despite the continual authoritarian control, public
confidence in the press increased from 33 to 47 percent between 1960 and 1973, while distrust
fell from 65 to 30 percent in that time. The public also became more interested in the news, and
were able to get information about previously prohibited topics, such as strikes and protests.
Furthermore, between 1966 and 1974, the percentage of Spaniards in favor of freedom of
expression increased from 40 to 74 percent (Gunther), a notable leap in the public support for
liberalization. Thus, the public opinion was in line with the new liberal legislation, therefore only
increasing the societal movement toward greater expressive freedoms not only in cultural outlets,
but in the press. With this new shift, the Authoritarian Theory was failing in Spain.
The apertura, however, would not completely liberate the press and cultural outlets in the
country, and historians often refer to it as a partial liberalization, not yet to the standards of the
press freedom the Western world typically enjoys today (Gunther). Fraga would ultimately not
have done much to change this norm, as he would “administer the law in such a way as to alter,
but not to end, the censorship practices of the regime…” (Herrero-Olaizola 1-2). All
publications still had to adhere to the strict standards of the authoritarian regime but, at this point,
publishers were already practicing self-censorship.
The practice of self censorship is one of the ways we can expand the Authoritarian
Theory in this scenario. Although nothing in the theory calls for self censorship by name, it is a
direct product of the fear the press felt from the possibility of criminal charges or prosecution, as
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outlined in the fifth principle of the Theory. Furthermore, self-censorship actually hinders study
of press and other published media under the regime. As stated previously, censorship is a
difficult concept to find evidence for, because the evidence is that there is no evidence. That
being said, with publishers (both in the press and in literature, as we will see in the next section)
practicing self-censorship, there were fewer traces of pre-censored material, as limits were now
in place during the creation process. Thus, there is even less evidence than before Fraga’s law, as
censors were getting less and less material that needed government control as publications opted
to self censor to avoid the hassle or delay in publishing that often came from censor
examinations.
Although this new law assured a new freedom for the press, it also continually led to
heavy fines, confiscation of newspaper and magazine issues, or closure of said publisher. In fact,
on July 21, 1966 (the same year the Ley Fraga was implemented), Spanish authorities ordered
the confiscation of the monarchist daily paper, ABC, for its publication of an article by Luis
María Anson that violated the content limitations of the regime (Fusi and Carr 123-124). During
the 20th century, ABC was one of the most popular and important Spanish newspapers, and had
been a daily paper since 1905. Although it had strong ties to the Catholic Church and generally
supported Franco’s government, the paper always maintained its preference for a monarchy over
a dictatorship (Pressreference).
In the article in question, Anson openly supported one of Franco’s opponents, Don Juan
de Borbón, who promoted the monarchy over the authoritarian system in place. Clearly, this
opposition went against Franco’s political ideology and violated the prohibition of content that
criticized the regime, a key principle in the Authoritarian Theory. As a result, the government
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swiftly confiscated the offending publication, again demonstrating their authoritarian power over
the country’s media, no matter how popular the publication may be (Fusi and Carr 123-124).
But the new liberalization of the apertura was not without obstacles. The new freedom
brought on by the Ley Fraga halted temporarily between January and March of 1969, when the
Basque terrorist group ETA began carrying out acts of terrorism in the name of their region’s
freedom, causing the government to declare a state of emergency. The ETA’s movements in
northern Spain, along with conflicts with students and workers in other parts of the country,
temporarily restored the previous rigorous censorship policies on the press (Barrera and
Apezarena). This was to ensure that publications would not encourage such aggressive and antiregime acts, but once the conflicts died down and the government had better control over the
situation, the apertura resumed as before.
As Franco’s time was coming quickly to an end, the country began to fall into chaos. In
1972, the daily evening paper Madrid was shut down by the government. The Madrid was a
notoriously progressive press organization, and after its closure, its offices were bombed on
April 21, 1973, and its editor forced into exile. The Madrid’s closing is just one of many
publications and organizations that suffered closures or fines due to their work even during the
apertura. However, this unjust closure did not do much to faze the press, which was already on a
path of increased criticism toward the regime now it had worked out how to get around the strict
restrictions (Fusi and Carr 143).
At the absolute end, only a year before Franco himself would die with his movement,
public and media dissent was growing rapidly, and the government opened the restrictions even
further. Arias Navarro, who would become the first prime minister of the monarchy after
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Franco’s death, proposed a new, second apertura for the country, met with enthusiasm by the
press. From then on, the press enjoyed more freedom that had not been seen in the country for
decades, and initiated a new interest in political activism in society. This second liberalization
period also influenced the artistic media, and nude figures were suddenly allowed in the press, as
well as in film, art, and theater. Scandalized, Franco and his most conservative supporters
disapproved, but this marked the first step in the liberalization of Spain’s society and culture, as
well as continued liberalization of the press. For the first time, the press could report freely on
the strikes, terrorism and political happenings in the country, and were allowed to report on
political leaders with new freedom. The Authoritarian Theory at work in Spain continued to
crumble, and the freedom Spain would see post-Franco was in sight.
But this new, last stretch of freedom didn’t go without opposition. On April 28, 1974,
Jose Antonio Girón de Velasco published a manifesto in Arriba, expressing his disdain for the
new press freedoms and warning that the still-conservative government would not allow the
regime to be criticized (Fusi and Carr 152-155). Franco’s supporters were employing last-ditch
efforts to uphold the regime their dying ruler had created, but were realizing that the hold they
once had upon the media and the authoritarian rule that had worked for so long was dwindling as
fast as Franco’s heath.
Despite the argument by some franquismo experts that the regime loosened its hold on
the country (and, namely, the press) during the tail end of Franco’s dictatorship, the fact remains
that the government in Spain remained fully authoritarian for all 36 years. This supposed
“relaxation” of the government to the press was only applicable to the conservative factions, who
aligned themselves with Franco’s ideals in their publications (or, perhaps, knew better than to
publish any criticism). Furthermore, the small liberty from the government was only granted to
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those in higher socio-economic classes, who were generally conservative and could be trusted
not to cause conflict by acting or speaking out against the government. Although the dictator’s
power was failing, the regime began and ended its years controlling the print news media
through the Authoritarian Theory of Mass Communication.
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Part Four: Non-Journalism Print Media
By definition (and historically), the Authoritarian Theory only applies to the news media.
However, given the widespread use of censorship and the consistency of the limitations and
prohibitions Franco imposed upon the media, we can apply the theory to other platforms, such as
non-news print media such as literature and theater. As we will see, the government and the
Junta censorship boards held the same standards of censorship to other platforms as they did for
the press; literature and theater were not allowed to produce critical political commentary,
criticize the Catholic Church, promote other religions, or discuss communist ideology. Given
these restrictions, the Authoritarian Theory of Mass Communication can be expanded to include
other media platforms in addition to the printed news press.
In the time of Franco’s reign from 1939 to 1975, about 500 thousand books were
published in Spain, all of which had to get the approval of a censor to reach the public. The
government also issued “orders” when it came to literature and plays, similar to the orders they
issued to the newspapers and magazines. Beginning immediately after Franco’s established role
as caudillo and dictator, the theater community was subjected to requirements for plays that
advocated Catholic and nationalistic ideology (Lea). Although it is still unclear today exactly
how many of the works were subjected to orders, cuts or changes, there is still evidence of some
changes in Spanish literature today, 42 years after Franco’s death. But the regime also affected
foreign writer’s works. Novelists like Ernest Hemingway, George Orwell, James Baldwin and
Ian Fleming were censored due to various content violations.
The first, and perhaps the most predictable cuts in the offending literature was to
passages or phrases that criticized the Spanish Civil War, the government, or Franco himself. It
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is no surprise that Franco would want any criticism toward him or his country to go unseen by
the Spanish citizens, and augmented his propaganda by also stripping any offensive content from
other reading materials beside the press. Secondly, Franco’s censors cut all critical passages
toward the Catholic Church, as well as material that did not align with its morals and values (i.e.
sexually explicit scenes, etc.) For instance, in the James Bond novels by Ian Fleming, the typical
sexual relations with Bond’s many swooning women went unread by the Spaniards, as pages of
this material was cut by Franco’s government in the Spanish copies of the novels (Lea).
Hemingway, however, was perhaps the most notorious for his subjugation to the
censorship, as well as his reaction to it. In his novel Across the River and Into the Trees,
Hemingway’s writing was changed even down to the word choice: the word “lesbians” was not
acceptable, and changed to “good friends.” His bitingly critical characterization of “General Fat
Ass Franco” was unsurprisingly changed as well to “General Asno Gordo” (or “fat donkey”).
Even versions as recent as 2001 contain these edits, although Franco’s regime ended in 1975.
Nevertheless, his legacy lives on in the literature that has been left untouched since its
censorship, and has mostly gone unnoticed by the public. Anyone without an outside knowledge
of other versions of these texts would have no inclination that there was anything to be
suspicious of in the first place (Buck).
A phenomena that was common in literary censorship above all other types was
“linguistic purity,” or the tendency for Spanish censors to make foreign novels and translations
“more Spanish.” Under the regime, Franco ordered that Castellano (Spanish) was the only
language allowed for printed material, which included all press, literature, cinema, etc. (HerreroOlaizola 7). Specifically, the regime worked to suppress the use of Basque and Catalan, the
regional languages of the Basque Country and Cataluña, respectively (Solsten and Meditz).
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However, there was always a catch: the regime defined what “proper” Spanish was, and
therefore tended to look down on Latin American works for their “impure” language. That is to
say, they regarded Latin American novelists’ use of Spanish subpar compared to the
“acceptable” Spanish of Spain. It was a common occurrence for censors to change Latin
American vernacular or phrases to better align with the “proper” language standards. These
censors were not for content, but rather a product of the superiority complex the regime and its
nationalism idealization. Non-Spanish works also became the target of censorship, as the
translations were often “unacceptable” for the linguistic purity expectations of the regime.
However, preserving this linguistic purity also became a guise for rejection due to immoral or
overly-critical content (Herrero-Olaizola 7).
A specific example of this patronizing censorship practice was toward author Gabriel
García Márquez, who experienced censorship as a novelist with his book La mala hora in 1962.
Upon examining the novel when published in Spain, García Márquez was dismayed to find that
his text had been modified to “correct Castilian,” removing all “Americanisms,” and changing
phrases that were not “Spanish” enough for the audience. Unsurprisingly, there is no record of
who, specifically, made these linguistic changes, though it is clearly the world of the Junta.
Although undocumented, this is clearly a specific case of censoring text for “linguistic purity,”
which was a common practice for Latin American authors’ works (Herrero-Olaizola 128-129).
The practice of linguistic purity is one of the few instances of censorship during the
franquismo era that does not fall under the typical definition of the Authoritarian Theory.
Although this theory is already stretched to include other media platforms, it is too far of an
extrapolation to include linguistic purity as well, as this method was not about censoring because
of ideology reasons, but simply just a sense of superiority the regime held above all other
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languages besides Spanish. Although this practice does not fall under the classic definition of the
Authoritarian Theory, it does qualify as a type of censorship, which does play into the Theory,
further demonstrating the various measures the franquismo government took to impose absolute,
powerful censorship upon the country’s media. No one censorship means qualifies or disqualifies
this era as an example of the Theory, as it is the entire situation as a whole that embodies and
exemplifies this particular press theory and the power a totalitarian government can have upon a
country.
Along with experiencing linguistic purity censorship, García Márquez also experienced
criticism from a new repressive force: the citizen censor. Under the guise of a concerned parent,
Vernet Mateu, a Spanish citizen and Franco supporter, wrote a scathing letter to Spanish
authorities about García Márquez’s novel Cien anos de soledad, which was full of “repugnant”
content. It is doubtful that the censors simply did not catch these immoral passages, but probable
that they instead looked the other way, so to speak, to allow for its publication. Mateu is harshly
critical of not only García Márquez, but the censoring boards for this oversight, and included
photocopies of the offending passages to fully demonstrate its obscenity, which he felt “corrupts
and brutalizes sixteen-year-old boys” (Herrero-Olaizola 138). Mateu serves as an example of
how caught up some regime sympathizers were with the policies, especially regarding
questionable content in books. In short, the influence of censorship not only affected the
government and the publishers, but seeped into Spanish society, causing some action on citizens’
part to uphold said censorship (Herrero-Olaizola 135-138).
However, the most common reason for literature censorship was for questionable content,
consistent with the censorship of the press under the Authoritarian Theory. One Latin American
author who bypassed content censorship with talent was Vargas Llosa, a Peruvian writer who, on
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principle, rejected censorship of all kinds. His novels, however, were so well written that the
censors often overlooked questionable moral, often “pornographic” content due to its “’strong
literary quality.’” But Llosa also had to contribute a certain amount of flexibility and cooperation
toward the censors to get this result, and his willingness to conform (to a certain degree) paid off
with the publication of his novels that, under other circumstances, would undoubtedly have been
banned (Herrero-Olaizola 40-41).
Because of the franquismo literary restrictions, many prominent authors either chose or
were forced into exile. They refused to adhere to the strict censorship policies over their works,
and thus left the country. This purge of authors and artist was also implemented on an larger
level; cultural and intellectual organizations that did not follow the regime’s content or language
requirements were also eliminated, which unfortunately resulted in “a decided gap in scholarly
and creative production” (Lea). Included in the persecuted authors were playwrights Antonio
Burero Vallejo and Alfonso Sastre, both of whom were victimized for the political commentary
in their works. After being a political prisoner for six years, Vallejo wrote La historia de una
escalera in 1949, which “painted an exceptionally dark and seething portrait of El Caudillo and
his followers” (Lea). However, Vallejo obscured his criticisms with symbolism, and wrote in a
way that was barely possible under the censorship policies. This not only demonstrates Vallejo’s
skill as a writer, but his immense courage to take on the regime and risk further incarceration or
exile for his criticisms (Lea).
In one instance, the adverse behavior toward the regime led to a writer’s death. Poet and
playwright Federico García Lorca was one of thousands of casualties of the regime, but he has
only just recently been recognized as such. For years, Franco and his government claimed that
García Lorca’s death in 1936 was nothing more than a result of his involvement with rebel forces
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during the Civil War. However, in an article in El País (as quoted in The Guardian), a García
Lorca biographer Ian Gibson revealed that Franco’s government actually murdered the poet, a
significant difference from the accidental death story that had been regime rhetoric for years.
Thus, writers during the Civil War and franquismo were not only in danger of being censored or
exiled, but also of being killed on government orders (Kassam). Here again we see fear of
criminal prosecution and punishment as an incentive to follow the censorship policies of the
government inspired by the basic principles of the Authoritarian Theory.
Just as the apertura of the Ley Fraga in 1966 caused a change in the workings of the
press, it also impacted book publishers in two significant ways: it modified previous procedures
on consultation and prior censorship of the work, and it changed procedures regarding archiving
of works, which, previously, had resulted in books being confiscated for offending material. This
confiscation policy had caused economic loss for publishers, so the new law was ushered in with
cautious enthusiasm and hope for a change (Castro).
Furthermore, previous to the apertura, there were no deadlines were set for the
government to respond to publishers with their censor edits. This often resulted in delays in
production and publication, which was a “severe hindrance to the success of the publishers in the
booming and fiercely competitive book market of the 1960s and 1970s. For years they had
begged for leniency when it came to the censorship rules; the 1966 law was the regime’s
response to their demands.” New rules through the Ley Fraga allowed for direct negotiation with
censorship authorities and policies, rather that the bureaucratic silence that had crippled
publishers before. Now, publishers could submit their self-censored works under the new policy
of “voluntary submit” to the government, which would give a final verification that the work was
acceptable before publishing it. This is quite a different process from the “consulta obligatoria”
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of years previously, which required publishers to submit their works for a thorough examination
that would often delay the publication process (Herrero-Olaizola 9).
Another significant change that came with the Ley Fraga was within the concept of the
“silencio administrativo,” or “official silence.” In this policy, censors would opt to stay “silent”
regarding a work when it contained questionable content but also showed potential benefits if
published. When claiming silencio administrativo, censors would not officially approve of a
work, but would not ban it, thus allowing it to be published with little to no censorship imposed.
Under the new Ley Fraga, this was an advantage for publishers, as it would allow a publisher to
print said text without limits (Herrero-Olaizola 11). The term “silencio administrative,” however,
also refers to the process in which the Junta would choose to not comment on a work at all,
therefore leaving it in a state of limbo: not approved, not banned, and unmoving in the
bureaucracy of the censorship boards (Castro). This was a tactic in which the authorities could
simply ignore a book’s request for publication, and block its distribution by simply not doing
anything, a new twist on the ways the government could implement their authoritarian power
over publishers. Rather than overtly censoring writers and publishers (though justified in the
principles of the Authoritarian Theory), the Junta could opt to not do anything, a sly and perhaps
passive aggressive tactic that was nevertheless effective in blocking various works of literature.
Another key reason the Ley Fraga was met with such enthusiasm and optimism is
because it allowed a new advantage for writers and publishers: negotiation. Now writers could
negotiate with the censors on issues within the material, a right that was unheard of in years
previously. Publishers employed various negotiation and compromising tactics under this new
law, including “softening” the translation, resubmitting the same book with another title, cover,
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or translation (these could be found simultaneously or separately), or changing the declared
number of books published. (Castro)
Writers and publishers often had to relinquish some rights for the benefit of the censors,
such as agreeing to cut parts of the work, “soften” the translation (changing potentially critical
passages to “nicer” versions, as seen in the Hemingway example previously), or distribute it to
the least amount of readers possible. Although these situations were not ideal for writers looking
to publish their work nor for publishers trying to make a profit, it was a necessary sacrifice under
the censorship of the regime. However, as time went on, authors and publishers became
increasingly more willing to negotiate and talk with the censorship board, as the intimidation
methods they had previously used upon the publishers were no longer working (Castro).
Publishers also tried to circumvent censorship policies by resubmitting same book with a
different title. If a book was previously denied by the censors, publishers would sometimes
change the title in some way or adjust the translation of the title, and then resubmit it. Most times
the change of title worked and deceived the censors, who did not recognize the book before
reading it and therefore accepted it for further examination. For example, a 1973 Spanish version
of The Betsy by Harold Robbins was previously denied by the censors for “lack of morality” and
sexual content. However, Robbins’ publishing house, Luis the Caralt, waited several months
before resubmitting the book under the title Los ejecutivos, which was then approved. A similar,
if not simultaneous ploy was resubmitting the book with a different cover, often replacing lewd
cover art with one that would appease the censors (Castro). However, by doing this, the
publishing house was risking the possibility that the censors could deduce what was happening
and deny the book again or worse, and inflict fines or sanctions upon the publisher.

45

Publishers also attempted to avoid censorship by re-translating previously denied texts.
Although the censors often cut portions of offending texts out, it was sometimes easier to just
ban it than mutilating it. However, publishers were able to circumvent this issue with retranslating the text to “fix” the offending, controversial passages, adapting the text to fit the
moral standards of the regime and its Catholic influences (Castro).
But, as stated previously, publishers often had to self-censor works so as to not get caught
up in the time-consuming process of going through the censors. While in the process of
translating foreign texts to Spanish, publishers would often preemptively self-censor passages
they knew would be scrutinized by government censors, bypassing any resistance the original
copy might have faced (Castro). The authors were aware of the rule, both written and implied,
and “knew what had to be done to comply with or subvert the values of the Establishment”
(Merino and Rabadan).
Unfortunately, this practice of self-censorship is even harder to identify and trace back
than overt, official censorship (which is hard enough to study on its own). Self-censorship,
however, is particularly difficult to trace because it leaves very few vestiges of pre-censored
versions that may have indicated what could have been if not for the policies in place. But, again,
this leads to a strange version of evidence: “These ‘non-existent’ texts reveal as much about the
motives and criteria underlying the decisions of the Censorship Boards” (Merino and Rabadan).
Therefore it is difficult to see the Authoritarian Theory in action with self censorship in place.
But with the knowledge of the censorship policies and the few vestiges of changed copies that
remain from the franquismo era, we can compare the true texts with the censor-approved ones as
see that, indeed, the regime had full power upon not only the press, but the non-news print media
as well.
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Although the genre of non-journalism print media does not fall under the technical
definition of the Authoritarian Theory, it is clear that this expansion works due to the same
policies and laws of journalistic media applied to this new category of media. This expansion,
therefore, is not an unreasonable extrapolation, but rather an appropriate extension of the classic
definition of this press theory that demonstrates more examples of a totalitarian censorship
system.
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Part Five: Digital Media: Television, Radio, and Cinema
During Franco’s era, digital media was growing in popularity and quality. Radio was
already a common media for news consumption, but television and cinema were rapidly growing
technologies that allowed the media (both for news and entertainment) to produce visual content.
However, despite the increase in popularity and innovation within these platforms, they were still
subjected to the censoring principles of the Authoritarian Theory and the content limitation the
regime imposed.
In 1939, the state issued a decree that censored the radio broadcasts, declaring that all
coverage of national and international news was reserved exclusively for the official
governmental network, Radio Nacional de Espana (RNE). Private broadcasts, though also
allowed, were required to transmit the government’s radio’s broadcast twice a day, making the
only news source the RNE. This strict requirement and other radio policies were consistent
throughout the regime, as radio, unlike print media, was not affected by the Ley Fraga, and was
not allowed the liberalization process until the country’s Constitution was written after Franco’s
death. Fraga himself actually restricted radio more during his time as Minister of Information; in
1963, there were 471 broadcasting stations throughout the country, but Fraga reduced this
number to about 200, and grouped them into six broadcasting networks. Within these 200
stations, about half were state-run, while the other half was operated by a network controlled by
the Catholic Church. Although Fraga was not the leader of the regime himself, he has a
significant role in the authoritarian control of the state, and was not afraid to exercise all
restrictions to appease the censorship requirements set forth by Franco and the policies of the
Authoritarian Theory.
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Due to the lack of diversity in coverage, daily radio listenership shrank from 86 to 33
percent from 1960 to 1974. Due to these shrinking numbers, television overtook radio as an
entertainment medium, and even surpassed print media as a news source, particularly for
international news. In 1973, a survey of Spaniards’ daily habits revealed that more citizens (75
percent) watched television every day than read a newspaper or listened to the radio (31 and 42
percent, respectively). The government was well aware of these high numbers of television
viewers, and subsequently used television as another propaganda tool, and was more strict on
television than radio or print media. However, Spaniards were more trusting of television than
other mediums, which explains its high viewing numbers as compared to other platforms
(Gunther).
Although not a part of the news cycle, we can also include cinema as part of the Spanish
media controlled under the Authoritarian Theory and the press laws set forth by the government.
While film is not part of the press, it was still subjected to strict censorship guidelines and
policies that restricted content that criticized the regime, promoted communism, or went against
the conservative Catholic ideology, restrictions consistent with those imposed on other
platforms.
Dubbing (recording Spanish dialogue over the original language’s dialogue) was
obligatory in the regime; films were either dubbed into Spanish or else banned completely. But
the dubbing was not always correct—censors would use the dubbing tool as a way to delete or
change parts of dialogue that were unsavory (Enforex). This falls in line with the practice of
linguistic purity, similar to that which was imposed upon literature, as well as consistent with the
principles of the Authoritarian Theory, which dictate that media must be subordinate to the
authoritative power and adhere to appropriate, government-approved content.
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Although control over cinema was strict, there was eventually a slight liberalization of
film. The Junta de Clasificacion y Censura de Peliculas Cinematograficas (Board of
Classification and Censorship of Cinematography) was created in 1962, and allowed more
movies to be screened in Spain whereas, previously, dubbed foreign films were banned for “poor
moral standards.” The Catholic Church, however, fought back against this new liberal and often
sensual screenings, as they “could not accept the growing distance between the Church and the
State.” Their opposition resulted in an official report in 1963 by the film industry’s censorship
board, which defended the new liberalizing decisions and provided a comprehensive list of the
censors in charge of deciding which movies would be banned or allowed.
Previous to this liberalization by the Junta, the Comisión Nacional de Censura
Cinematográfica (National Commission of Cinematographic Censorship) was in charge of
cinema censorship beginning in 1942, which often coordinated with the Catholic Church to
censor films that were morally problematic to the regime. The Church representative was the
only one on the board able to exercise the power of veto, again demonstrating the influence of
the Church in the government, especially its censorship practices (Gutierrez).
For example, on Feb 17, 1950, the Spanish ecclesiastical authorities approved the
“Instrucciones y normas para la censura moral de espectaculos,” a code for public performances
which included the following classifications for films: 1. Todas audiencias, incluyendo niños
(All audiences, including children); 2. Jóvenes (Young viewers 14-21); 3. Mayores (adults 21+);
3R. mayores, con reparos (adults but with concerns on moral grounds); 4. Gravemente peligrosa
(seriously dangerous, should probably be banned) (Gutierrez).
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According to the TRACE cinema catalogue (a depository of historic cinema data,
including notations about the censorship of said cinema), of the 1321 films authorized by the
censorship board that were English-language films between 1951-1962, only 13 (0.98%) were
classified as 4’s by the religious censors. Clearly this very small percent shows that the Junta
censorship board was typically inclined to follow the religious censors’ classifications and
overall reluctant to approve of films that were not approved by the Catholic Church.
In comparison, between 1962-1969, of the 1017 films dubbed from English to Spanish,
67 films (nearly 7%) were classified as 4’s, but then subsequently approved. This is clear,
numerical evidence that the system was becoming more liberal with its approval to film content,
and evidence that the censorship boards were tending to lean away from the influence of the
Church (Gutierrez).
Filmmakers and fans were able to get around censorship rules, however liberal, by the
establishment of Salas Especialses: specialized theaters that promoted screenings of “quality”
foreign films to small Spanish audiences. Although these screenings did not completely escape
censorship control, they did allow for audiences to see films that were unavailable to the general
public (Gutierrez). Furthermore, filmmakers were in constant negotiation with the censorship
boards to get their films approved for the general public. In order to avoid their films from being
banned, translators and distributors made changes before seeking the boards’ approval,
practicing self censorship, similar to publishers of literature and the press (Gutierrez).
As with print platforms, film production and screenings were also affected by the Ley
Fraga. The apertura was not only influenced by external opposition from society, but also an
internal source: José María García Escudero, a notably liberal figure in the system of censorship
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boards. Escudero was against the moral censorship from the Catholic Church, and argued that
instead of censoring films as a method to improve societal morality, the solution lay in the
education system. He argued that instead of banning movies, schools should implement moral
education, which would allow audiences to be more independently thinking in regards to a film,
rather than being drastically influenced by the film itself (which is what the Church was afraid
of). He expressed this view at a conference on Censorship and Freedom at the Universidad
Pontificia de Salamanca on December 16, 1951. Escudero’s educational system would “…se
trata de ensenar a dominar la película en vez de ser dominado por ella. (…it is about teaching
[the audience] to control the film instead of being controlled by it). ” In other words, it would
allow audiences to view films without the need for censorship methods in the first place. At the
same conference, Escudero stated that “Los beneficios de la censura-dije-se perciben en seguida
y sus perjuicios sólo a la larga; con la libertad sucede al revés: produce muchos males
inmediatos, que el tiempo transforma en buen medida en bienes (The benefits of censorship-I
said- are percieved immediately and its drawbacks only in the long run; with freedom it is the
opposite: it cuases a lot of immediate harm, which to a large extent time turns into good). ” From
the figure of Escudero alone, we can see that the mood of the regime and its opinions toward
censorship (in this case, in film) was loosening and becoming more liberal (Gutierrez).
As in print media, the shift in digital media that came with the apertura (with the
exception of the ever-controlled radio platforms which did not benefit from this) demonstrated
the decline of the Authoritarian Theory at work in Spanish media. The public desired a lessening
of the strict censorship policies, and foreign films allowed them a glimpse into what could be for
films. In short, it was the public opinion that most contributed to the failure of the authoritarian
hold on the media, which eventually broke as the regime collapsed.
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Part Six: Post-Franco and the Legacy Today
On November 20, 1975, Generalissimo Francisco Franco finally succumbed to his longfailing health problems. Franco died in his sleep, a peaceful end to the dictator who had began
his career with violence in chaos and sustained his power via scare tactics and propaganda. By
his death, opposition to his regime was expressed “almost openly,” as the power and control of
his government had diminished greatly since its beginnings (Lea). With his death came a time of
transition in Spain, most notably for the censorship measures he had imposed throughout his
regime.
Freedom of the press and other publications was not a priority upon Franco’s death
compared to the radical governmental shift and economic repairs that required revisions in the
following years (Solsten and Meditz). It took nearly a year for things to begin to change
politically, and Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez led this change with the Law for Political Reform
in 1976, which increased the freedom of the press, among other things (Gunther). But this reform
law did not undo the Ley Fraga of 10 years previously, and it would not be until the Constitution
of 1978 that this Press Law would be formally undone.
The first step to revamping the power structure of Spanish press was redistributing power
and ownership of the various platforms. State-run newspapers were sold or closed down, and the
radio monopoly the government ended (Villarroya). This allowed for a further increase in private
ownership of the press, unhindered by authoritarian power, as the Constitution drafted in 1978
explicitly allowed freedom of the press and artistic expression. On the cultural side of the media
platforms, much of the regional cultures silenced by the franquismo period were revived, and
new organizations were established to actively promote cultural expression (Villarroya).
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Publications, both in the press and in literature, took advantage of the suppressed society by
opting for uninhibited, very liberal content and images. For example, one of the most popular
magazines, Interviu, boasted their “unrestrained political reporting with equally uninhibited
photography. This blending of political and sexual liberation proved highly attractive to Spanish
readers, after Franco’s repressive policies in both these areas” (Solsten and Meditz).
However, while most publications celebrated this newfound freedom of expression, the
press of the state, right-wing publications, and the conservative monarchist daily paper ABC
resisted the new political change in the country. This support for the falling regime, however,
would be almost completely eliminated within two years as older generations in the newsrooms
were replaced with new journalists (Gunther).
Although a new Constitution was penned in 1978 to make Spain into a democracy after
Franco’s death in 1975, the 1966 Press Law was not formally replaced until 1988. Furthermore,
the Spanish government continued to subsidize certain press organizations starting in 1979,
which many believe may have influenced the press to continue to self-censor their work to better
suit the government even after Franco’s death. Therefore, it was not his death that ceased the
censorship of the media, as clearly it continued, although in a more subtle and corrupt way.
However, the influence of the Authoritarian Theory was officially over. The government no
longer exclusively controlled the media in Spain, and those who had been censored no longer
feared retribution if they violated previous content requirements. In short, the press theory had
failed after 36 years.
However, it was the Constitution, above all other measures, that changed the freedom of
the press for the better and officially ceased the authoritarian power upon the press and other
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media. It specifically breaks down the new guarantees for freedom of expression into these
sections:
“Section 20.1: The following rights are recognized and protected:
a) the right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions through words, in
writing or by any other means of reproduction.
b) the right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation.
c) the right to academic freedom.
d) the right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of
dissemination whatsoever.
The law shall regulate the right to the clause of conscience and professional secrecy in
the exercise of these freedoms.
2. The exercise of these rights may not be restricted by any form of prior censorship.
3. The law shall regulate the organization and parliamentary control of the mass
communication media under the control of the State or any public agency and shall guarantee
access to such media by the significant social and political groups, respecting the pluralism of
society and of the various languages of Spain.
4. These freedoms are limited by respect for the rights recognised in this Part, by the legal
provisions implementing it, and especially by the right to honour, to privacy, to the own image
and to the protection of youth and childhood.
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5. The seizure of publications, recordings and other means of information may only be
carried out by means of a court order.”
“Section 20.3: The law shall regulate the organization and parliamentary control of the
mass communication media under the control of the State or any public agency and shall
guarantee access to such media by the significant social and political groups, respecting the
pluralism of society and of the various languages of Spain.”
“Section 149: The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters:
27. Basic rules relating to organization of the press, radio and television and, in general,
all mass-communications media without prejudice to powers vested in the Self-governing
Communities for their development and implementation.”
As we can see, these new guarantees are a far cry from the restrictions of the regime and
the previously imposed principles of the Authoritarian Theory. Although the state retained some
power over the press, such as the right to seize a publication with a court order, there was no
longer absolute power over the press. Instead, the Constitution distributed the power of the press
to the press itself, guaranteeing the freedom to express any and all opinions and political views,
in any language, and the right to report on all current events and political movements. In short,
all previous censorship policies were disbanded, and the press was finally free of the restrictive
authoritarian control.
Ultimately, Franco’s attempt to completely unify the country failed. After his death, a
Constitution was drafted that divided the country into 17 semiautonomous regions, but the old
fears of Spain dissolving once divided “have proved unfounded.” Now, the regions have their
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own cultures and proudly flaunt their own languages, something that was not even fathomable
under Franco (Schumacher).
However, the regime’s legacy and adoration for its leader does not just linger on in
policies. Hints of Franco and his impact on the country can be found sprinkled throughout Spain:
statues, streets and foundations named after Franco still remain, and supporters annually visit his
grave to “pray for his eternal soul,” an act that would be an outrage in other countries, such as if
Germans prayed for Hitler, or Italians prayed for Mussolini.
This grave, the Valle de los Caídos (or the Valley of the Fallen), is a physical example of
Franco’s propaganda. Republicans killed in the Civil War were brought to this site, and some are
still entombed there against the will of their surviving families, for the sake of making Franco’s
fallen supporters look bigger. Although some may argue that the site is a place where victims
from both sides can be laid to rest together, united in death as they weren’t in life, the fact
remains that this was not the chosen place of rest by some of the fallen. Indeed, it was yet
another propaganda tool to exalt the cause of the Nationalists.
Those who support Franco even today defend his violent military rebellion (which started
the Spanish Civil War) as a necessary movement to end the chaos of the time. Jaime Alonso,
vice president of the Francisco Franco Foundation in Madrid, maintains that Franco’s legacy
lives on, not just in the physical elements of the country, but in the political infrastructure.
Alonso said in an article in Financial Times, “’[Politicians] are afraid of him. They know very
well that Franco is more than just a reference, that he is something embedded in the culture of
the Spanish people as a solution.’”
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And yet, the Spanish education system lacks any concrete curriculum about the Civil
War, nor the dictatorship that followed. As a result, the population remains largely uneducated
about the franquismo period. Even today, there are no museums commemorating the era, besides
the mass grave at the Valley of the Fallen. Spain, uniquely, is one of the only previously dictatorled countries in Western Europe that has not faced its previous injustices head-on: there has been
no official apology to the victims or to the press, writers, and filmmakers that suffered from the
franquismo consequences. In short, Spain cannot reach a common ground on how to react
retroactively to the atrocities the Spanish people were subjected to for decades.
From 2004-2011, Spain’s socialist prime minster José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero pushed
previous limits on attempts to “repair” the country from the Franco era, funding exhumations of
Republican graves and passed a law that called for the removal of Franco statues and street
names. These movements, however, were faced with strong opposition from the right-wing,
conservative party and the Catholic Church, which opted to ignore or forget the past to move on.
So, again, efforts to undo Franco’s legacy was halted, as were last-minute legislation drafts to
change the Valley of the Fallen, which proposed to go as far as to remove Franco’s body from
the monument, as well as replace its supervision from the Catholic Church to another
organization. As of today, the Valle de los Caídos remains the same, Franco’s body laid to rest
among his supporters and his victims, in a monument built by prisoners of war from the
Republican side (Brown).
Spain, it all its new freedoms, is still hesitant to even address its oppressive past. Javier
Cercas, a Spanish novelist, finds this hesitancy to address the past a serious concern when
looking at the future of Spain: “There is no one way to deal with the past” he said in an article in
Financial Times, “…If there is no accord over the past, then the past can always be used, can
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always be manipulated. There is no accord over our past, and that means that finding an accord
over our present and our future is much more difficult. Can we live with this? Yes, we can live
with this. But would we live better if we had a common narrative? We would live much better”
(Brown).
Is Spain stuck in its old ways, lingering in the legacy of a dictator? Perhaps, but moving
on is not always easy to do, especially when it means changing legislature or societal norms. The
liberation of the media post-Franco certainly helped the country move on from the strict fascist
and heavily Catholic standards from decades previously, but the country could still take great
strides in moving on from the lingering franquismo in society. Nevertheless, the years of the
Authoritarian Theory at work in Spain are long gone, and its failure in Franco’s regime will
certainly ensure that Spain will never tolerate such a restrictive hold over the media again.
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